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WAYNE PEARCE, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• 
• 
Plaintiff-Appellant, • 
• 
vs. 
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and 
RICHARD OVESON, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
• 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18,376 
This is a wrongful death action by Wayne Pearce, the father 
of the deceased, Evan Pearce, against the defendants Martin J. 
Wistisen and Richard Oveson, for damages arising from the wrong-
ful death of Evan Pearce during a boating excursion on Utah Lake. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen 
with a jury, on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th days of December, 
1981. The jury delivered a special verdict on December 10, 1981. 
(R. at 194.) On December 23, 1981, in accordance with the verdict 
of the jury, the court ordered that plaintiff recover nothing 
from defendants, and that defendants recover of plaintiff their 
costs. (R. at 207.) 
Plaintiff filed his motion for a new trial on December 17, 
1981. (R. at 206.) The court denied plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial by its order filed March 26, 1982. (R. at 234.) A 
notice of appeal was filed on April 15, 1982. (R. at 240.) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that this Court reverse the lower 
court's decision and remand on the issue of damages, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff in this case is the father of the deceased, Evan 
Pearce. The plaintiff is suing for and on behalf of the heirs of 
Evan Pearce. Evan Pearce drowned in Utah Lake sometime between 
7:00 p.m., June 1, 1979 and 5:00 a.m., June 2, 1979. 
At the time of his death Evan Pearce had just graduated from 
Timpview High School in Provo, Utah. The incidents which led to 
his untimely death occurred the day after his high school gradua-
tion ceremony. 
Evan was in excellent health and was in extremely good 
physical condition at the time of the accident which claimed his 
life. He was an accomplished tennis player and was at times 
nationally ranked in his age group. (R. at 490.) 
Evan was the oldest of the three children in the Pearce 
family. He had a very close relationship with his younger brother 
and sister. (R. at 376.) He competed in doubles tennis with 
both his younger brother and sister and was an invaluable train-
ing partner and assistant for them. (R. at 377.) He and his 
family traveled extensively in connection with their athletic 
activities. This resulted in a close and confiding relationship 
between the deceased and his parents. (R. at 378.) 
The incidents which caused Evan's drowning occurred during a 
boating excursion on Utah Lake. Evan Pearce and Kevin Wistisen, 
-2-
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the minor child of defendant Martin J. Wistisen, formulated plans 
for the boating trip while returning from a graduation party that 
had been held in Provo Canyon on June 1, 1979. (R. at 405.) 
On the morning of the accident, Evan Pearce was in a good 
mental and physical state. Testimony at trial indicated that he 
was not tired and was not debilitated either mentally or physi-
cally; that he felt strong and eager for the days activities. 
(R. at 402-403, 527-528.) 
With both counsel present in chambers, counsel for plaintiff 
made a motion in limine as to any reference to Evan's consump-
tion of alcohol on the night and early morning preceding the 
evening of the drowning. (R. at 263.) Plaintiff was not informed 
of the defendants' intention to introduce such testimony or the 
identity of the witness who would so testify until the Friday 
(June 4) preceding the Monday (June 7) when the trial commenced. 
Plaintiff's argument in support of the motion in limine was that 
any consumption of alcohol which may have occurred was remote in 
time, irrelevant, and that its sole purpose was to inflame and 
prejudice the jury. Additionally, it was argued that the testi-
mony was an unfair surprise. (R. at 263-264.) The court ruled 
against plaintiff's motion in limine and conceded that "it may be 
error, Mr. Howard, but I have ruled." (R. at 264.) Counsel for 
the defendant admitted that neither he, nor the witness who was 
to testify about the drinking, knew how much alcohol was in Evan 
Pearce's system, if any, and that there was no way of determining 
it. (R. at 258.) 
The defendants did introduce testimony at trial to the 
-3-
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effect that Evan had been involved to some degree, in drinkin6 
beer at the graduation party which hdd ended more than twelve 
hours prior to the events in question. (R. at 545, 548.) Counsel 
for plaintiff made a timely objection that the testimony was 
irrelevant, immaterial and that any probative value was outweighed 
by its prejudicial nature. (R. at 545.) 
The plaintiff in order to rebut the prejudicial testimony, 
was forced to introduce evidence that the plainff's consumption 
of alcohol was limited and that the time of last consumption was 
not later than 5:30 a.m. the day of the accident. (R. at 401, 
402.) This was more than thirteen hours prior to the time of the 
beginning of the events leading to the fatality. (l{. at 336.) 
The boat in question was owned jointly by the defendants. 
(R. at 311, 642.) Each defendant testified that he had a 50% 
ownership in the boat and that botil defendants and their families 
shared in its use. Mr. Wistisen gave permission for Kevin Wistisen 
to take the boat on the day of the accident. (R. at 405.) 
Testimony of experts at trial indicated tnat the following 
equipment is required to be kept in a boat the size of the one 
involved in the accident: 
1. One life jacket per person of proper size 
so it can be worn effectively. 
2. One ring buoy or throwable device. 
3. Running lights on the boat. 
4. An oar or paddle. 
5. A horn. 
These are the items, the lack of which would result in the issuance 
of a citation. (R. at 451-45), 459.) 
Prior to leaving his house with the boat, Kevin ~vistisen 
"cleaned U.iJ" the buat by removing equiiJment such as paddles and 
-4-
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life preservers. (~. at 407, 436.) Testimony at trial e~taolished 
that when the boat was on the water at the time of th~ erner6 ency 
it did not have the followiu6 statutorily required items: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Paddles or oars. 
Sufficient life jackets for the number of 
people aboard the boat. 
A ring buoy or throwable device. 
Functional lights. (Kevin Wistisen had 
cut off all electrical power in the boat 
before leaving it, and had failed to 6ive 
the girls remaining on board any instruc-
tions as how to make the lights functional.) 
It is disputed as to whether a horn was 
present on board. 
(R. at 368-375, 343, 407, 409.) 
An anchor is statutorily required when a boat is unbeachable. 
There was some difference of opinion on the issue of the beachability 
of the boat in question, with one expert indicating that in a 
windstorm, the boat would not be beachaole on Utai1 Lake. This 
would mean that without an anchor, the boat was subject to being 
cited for the lack of an anchor on board. (R. at 468.) The 
experts who were not of the opinion that the lack of an anchor 
would subject the boat operator to a citation, were in agreement 
that it would be an "essential" piece of equipment on a boat of 
that size. (R. at 477, 612.) Tile experts also testified that a 
safety flare, which the boat in question did not have at the time 
of the accident, was "essential", although not required by statute. 
(R. at 609.) 
In the early afternoon of July 1, 1979, Kevin Wistisen 
~icked up Evan Pearce, Leslie Pearce, and Angela Adams who were 
the other participants in the activity. They proceeded to the 
Pruvo Boat Harbor and launched the boat at C:iJ:Jf>roximately 5:UO 
p.m. (R. at 406.) 
-5-
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The grou~ proceeded in the boat to the west side of Utah 
Lake and botl1 Evan Pearce and Leslie Pearce waterskied. (R. at 
364.) The 6rou~ stayed on the west side of the lake until early 
evening at which time they started back to the boat harbor with 
Evan Pearce skiing behind the boat. (R. at 365.) 
By this time a wind had come up and the water had become 
4uite chop~y. Evan fell after hitting some lar6 e waves. (R. at 
366.) After Evan fell, Kevin Wistisen turned the boat to the left 
and ran over the ski rope while rnakint; the turn to retrieve t:van 
Pearce from the water. (R. at 346, 366.) Expert testimony at 
trial established that regulations exist which require the operator 
of a boat to approach a fallen waterskier from tne driver's side 
of the boat. The driver's side of the boat in question is on Lhe 
right. (R. at 473.) Both Angela Adams and Leslie Pearce testi-
fied that Kevin Wistisen turned the boat to the left, not to the 
driver's side, to pick up Evan Pearce. This would constitute a 
violation of the regulation. Defendant admitted runnin6 over the 
rope but denied making an im~roper turn. 
Running over the rope in this manner caused it to become 
entangled in the propeller and prevented the en6ine from operating. 
(R. at 366.) Kevin Wistisen raised tne outdrive and attempted to 
untangle the rope from the propeller. (R. at 36u.) He was 
unable to do so from inside the boat, so he lifted tne en6ine 
cowl and switched off all electrical power in tlle boat, put on a 
life jacket, and without t:;iving any instructions to the two girls 
as to the operation of the boat or location of any emer0 ency 
equipment in the boat, he entered the water to attem~t to remove 
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the tangled rope. (R. at 367-368.) Heither of the 5irls in tue 
boat had any previous experience or instruction in the operation 
of a boat, nor wer~ they adequately pret>ared to haudie tne emer-
gency which developed. (R. at 330.) 
While these events transpired Evan Pearce was still in the 
middle of the lake three miles from closet shore. The boat was 
approximately two miles from the closet shore. (R. 427.) Because 
of the strong wind which had developed that afternoon, the boat 
was being blown away from Evan. (R. at 409.) Evan tried to swim 
to the boat, but was impeded by the lite jacket he was wearin6 . 
In an effort to get to the boat before it became completely 
unreachable, Evan took off his life jacket and tried to swim to 
the boat. (R. at 36~.) Because of the rate at which the boat 
was being driven by the wind, Evan was unsuccessful in his atternj:>t 
to reach the boat. (R. at ]b8.) The two ·irls who were still in b 
the boat, Leslie Pearce and Ant:>eia Adams, informed Kevin Wistisen 
of Evan's plight. Kevin then swam back toward Evan while holdin6 
onto the ski rope that trailed out behind the boat. (R. at 369.) 
While Kevin was holding the end of the rope and reaching for 
Evan, the rope broke leaving both boys stranded in the lake. 
Kevin made an attempt to swim to the boat, but because of the 
wind he was unable to reach the boat. (R. at 370.) Kevin then 
swam back to where Evan was. Evan yelled to the ~irls in the 
boat asking them to throw him a life jacket. (R. at 370-371.) 
tiecause the boat was not properly equi~ped, in that it had only 
three life jackets for four peuple, th-:re was only one jacket 
remaining in the boat. (R. at 407.) Leslie Pearce then threw 
-7-
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out the only remaining jacket to Evan and he was a.ble to reac11 
it. The jacket that was thrown out was the blue Jacket that was 
not large enough to fit a person of Evan's size and Evan was, 
therefore, unable to zip it up the front even though he did put 
it on. (R. at 411, 426.) The jacket, therefore, was open in 
the front by four or five inches and supported tl1e body only in 
the shoulders and the back. Because the jacket was too small 
and would not zip ut, it forced the user to wear it in such a 
precarious way that it subjected him to the possibility of 
slipping out of, or though it. 
The boat was by now some distance from the boys in the 
water, and the boys were unable to comillunicate to the 6irls any 
instructions as to the operdtion of the boat. (R. at 371.) Tne 
boat at this time was in about nine to ten feet of water. (R. 
at 442.) The girls looked for an anchor to stop the boat from 
drifting. They also searched for a paddle witll which to manuever 
tne boat. (R. at 37l.) No such equipment was on the boat. (R. 
at 372, 4-7.) The boat continued to drift until it was com.t:Jletely 
separated both visually and audibly from the boys stranded in the 
water. (R. at 673.) 
The boys decided to swim to the west shore. (R. at 426.) 
Although this was the closet shore, they were still several miles 
out. (R. at 427.) After it became dark the boys were separated 
and that was the last time Evan Pearce was seen alive. (R. at 
415, 427.) 
Kevin Wistisen was able to reach the shore almost five hours 
later and phoned his home to inform hts parent~ of the incident. 
-8-
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(R. at 414.) A Utah Cuunty Sheriff then Ccilile and picked .Keviu 
Wistisen up on the west snore and took him back to the Provu ~oat 
Harbor where his family and others were waitin·-·. 
. 0 (R. at 415. ) 
During this same evening the families of the youn6ster~ in 
the boat became worried and went to the boat harbor tu investigate. 
The truck and boat trailer driven by Kevin Wistisen were there, 
it was now dark and the boat had not returned. Another boat with 
Wayne Pearce, Evan Pearce's fatner, went out to search. They 
found nothing and returned to the boat harbor to learn that Kevin 
Wistisen had been found. (R. at 495.) At this time the sheriffs 
department actively joined in the search. (R. at 496.) It was 
not until the next morning at approximately 5:00 a.rn. that the 
boat with the two girls was found. (R. at 376, 499.) The two 
girls, although extremely cold and frightened, were otherwise 
safe when picked up by the boat from the De.tJartrnent of Parks and 
Recreation. A helicopter search that same morning resulted in 
the location of the two life jackets, the yellow one Evan Pearce 
had on when he was waterskiing, and the blue one he was thro~1 
that did not fit and would not zip up. (R. at 499.) When the 
blue life jacket was found the certainty of the younb man's fate 
became a reality for his parents and those conductint; the search. 
Search efforts continued throughout the week, but the remains 
of Evan Pearce were not found until approximately eight days 
later. (R. at 499.) 
At the close of evidence, counsel for plaintiff made a 
motion for a directed verdict in regard to liability or ne6lj_5ence 
on the grounds that: 
-9-
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1. Defendants' negligence had been estab-
lished by clear and convincint; evidence, 
or in the alternative; 
2. That defendants were negligent as a 
matter of law and that such ne6ligence 
was the proximate cause of the death of 
the decedent, or in the alternative; 
3. That defendants were negligent as a 
matter of law and that the case should 
be submitted to the jury on the issue of 
whether such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the death of the decedent. 
(R. at 660-662.) The court denied plaintiff's motion. 
6 70.) 
(R. at 
Plaintiff objected to and took exceptions to the Jury in-
structions given by the court as follows: 
1. The instructions did not adequately 
instruct the jury as to the theory of the 
plaintiff's case. 
2. Instruction 10 refers to life expectancy, 
and the court did not bive the jury a 
life expectancy instruction. 
3. Instruction numb~r 11 is error because it 
refers to a reasonable discount witnout 
considering inflationary rates. 
4. Instruction 12 is error because it is a 
double instruction in that it gives 
double emphasis to defendants' theory of 
the litigation. 
(R. at 673-674.) 
Plaintiff objected to the failure of the court to give his 
requested instruction 19 on damabes. (R. at 675.) Plaintiff 
also objected to the failure of the court to give the requested 
instruction 1, regarding plaintiff's theory of the case, instruc-
tion 6, regarding the statutory liability of one who owns a boat 
and entrusts it to a minor; instruction 7, regarding the statutory 
duty of the owner of a motorboat to equip it with certain minimum 
safety devices; and instruction 13, re(:)ardinb the presumption 
that the deceased was exercising due care for his safety. (R. 
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at 675-676.) 
Plaintiff objected to the verdict form because it submitted 
the question of damages in a general way and not as to each of 
the heirs. (R. at 674-67S.) 
ARGUMEd'f 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FAILUR~ TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTKUCTiur~ 
NUMBER 6 ON IMPUTED LIABILITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §73-18-18 WAS 
ERROR. 
In the present case, the only defendants were the joint 
owners of a motorboat which was being driven and which was under 
the control of the minor son of one of the defendants. Plaiutiff's 
theory of the case was that the defendants were vicariously 
liable for the negligence of the minor who operated the boat with 
the consent of the owner. The only way that the 2laintiff could 
successfully proceed against the defendants was on the basis of 
vicarious liability because the defendants themselves had no 
direct participation in the events wl1ich led to the fatality of 
Evan Pearce. 
At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence as to tne defen-
dant's ownership of the boat. It was undisputed that ")") . r'"evin 
Wistisen, at the time of the incident, was a minor and that he 
had possession of and was operatin6 the boat with the express 
consent of one of the owners, and with th~ implied consent of the 
other owner. 
In order to instruct the jury as to that theory, the plain-
tiff requested the following instruction: 
You are instructed that the law of the State 
of Utah, Utan Code Ann. §73-18-18, provides 
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as follows: 
The owner of a vessel shall be 
liable for any injury or dama~e 
occasioned by the negligent oper-
ation of such vessel by a minor 
under the age of eighteen years 
operating such vessel with the 
express or implied consent of the 
owner, whether under the laws of 
this State or by neglecting to 
observe such ordinary care and such 
operation as the rules of common 
law require. 
Therefore, if you find that Kevin L. Wistisen 
was negligent in the operation of the boat, 
either in regard to violation of one of the 
laws of the State or by his failure to exercise 
ordinary care, caution and prudence, and that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of 
the death of Evan Pearce, then you shall find 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants. 
1he trial court failed to give that instruction and the ~laintiff 
made a timely objection to said failure. 
The instructions 6iven by ti1e court which bear some rela-
tion to the liability of tt1e owners of the boat are contained in 
Instructions Number 5 and 6. (R. at 178-180.) Instruction 
Number 5 states only, "the plaintiff has the burden of persuadin6 
you that the defendants Martin J. Wistisen and/or Richard Oveson 
and/or the boat operator Kevin Wistisen was negligent [sic] ... " 
While Instruction Number 6 does indicate that the owners of a 
boat are required to have it equipped wit~ necessary safety 
equipment, the instruction repeatedly refers to the responsi-
bility of the operator to have that equipment and not the owners. 
The instruction says nothing about any liability of the owners 
for the neglj_gence of the minor operator of the boat. The refer-
ence of the instruction to the duty of the owners to keep equip-
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ment on the boat was ineffective in view of the facts preseuted 
at trial indicating that the minor son of tile defendant Wistisen 
took what few safety equipment items were owned by the defen-
dants out of the boat. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-18-18 (1980), establishes the propriety 
of the requested instruction number 6 as a matter of law. The 
failure to give the instruction, was error, in that, the only 
impression that could be drawn by the jury was that the imputed 
negligence of the onwers was not the law or the view of the 
court. 
In the case of Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 
1981), this court discussed the issue of the trial court's obli-
gation to submit the theory of a party to the jury if there is 
evidence adduced in su~~ort thereof. In its holdin~, the court 
stated as follows: 
The well-recognized 6 eneral rule entitles a 
party to have his theory of the case submitted 
to the jury. Where there is evidence adduced 
to support a party's theory of the case, it 
is prejudicial error for the trial court to 
fail to instruct th~reon. 
With respect to vicarious liability, it was absolutely 
essential that the instruction be given, at least in substance, 
as requested by the plaintiff. This is so, because there were 
several acts of negligence by Kevin Wistisen which more directly 
contributed to the fatality than others. Unless the jury were to 
know that the owners were responsible for all acts of nee,ligence 
by Kevin Wistisen, the jury might, as they did in the present 
case, find that any 11egligence of the named defendants was not a 
proximate cause of the fatality in questio11. 
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The principal acts of neglit:,ence by Kevin Wistisen were 
removing the required safety equipment from the boat ?rior to the 
excursion, causing the rope to become entan0 led in the propeller 
mechanixrn, and leavinc; the two t;irls in the boat completely 
uninstructed in the operation thereof with the power 11avin6 been 
disconnected. These ne3ligent acts, singly or in combinatior1, 
were the proximate cause of the death of the decedent, Evan 
Pearce. Because there was no instruction imputing liability for 
these negligent acts to the named defendants, the jury was only 
able to consider the named defendants' inde?endent negligence 
which was found not to be the proximate cause of the injuries. 
Unless the Court should find that other instructions presented 
the plaintiff's theory in regard to vicarious liability, the 
holding in the Watters case requires a findi110 that the failure 
to give instruction number 6 was prejudical error and brounds for 
reversal. 
POli~T II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS SUBTA.NTIALLY PREJUDICED HY TH.E El{KONt:OUS 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENC~ COl~CERNI.NG ALCOHOL CON~UHPT IOH BY Ttl~ 
DECEASED, EVAN PEA~CE. 
Rule 4 of the Utah ~ules of Evidence states the law concerninb 
the erroneous admission of evidence: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, 
nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous 
admission of evidence, unless (a) there 
appears of record objection to the evidence 
timely interposed and so stated as to make 
clear the specific t;round of objection, and 
(b) the court which passes upon the effect of 
the error or errors is of the opinion that 
the admitted evidence should have been excluded 
on the grounds stated and probably had a 
substantial influence in bringin~ about the 
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verdict or finding. However, the court in 
its discretion, and in the interest of 
justice, may review the erroneous admission 
of evidence even though the grounds of th~ 
objection thereto are not correctly stated. 
In the present case, the court erroneously allowed the 
defendants to introduce two se~arate items of evidence which had 
substantial influence in bringin6 about the verdict of no cause 
of action against the plaintiff. Those two items of evidence 
were testimony concerning the illegal purchase of an alcoholic 
beverage by the plaintiff and testimony concernin0 the plaintiff's 
consumption of alcoholic beverages many hours prior to the events 
which led to his death. That testimony was given by Mr. Rod Hunt 
who had accompanied the deceased on the evening and morning 
preceding the eveing of the accident. The plaintiff was not 
aware of the identity of that witness until the Friday preceding 
the Monday which commenced trial. The plaintiff had no opportunity 
to depose that witness or prepare adequately for cross-examinina-
tion. 
Once the plaintiff discovered that the defendants intended 
to introduce such evidence, the ~laintiff made a motion in limi11e 
to prevent the introduction of said evidence. The motion in 
limine was denied, and the _t>laintiff thereafter made timely and 
specific objections to the admission of said evidence in the 
course of the trial. The objections presented by the plaintiff 
in its motion and at trial were that the evidence was remote in 
time, irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and constituted unfair 
surprise. 
Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines "relevant 
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evidence" as that evidence "havin<_; any tendency in reason to 
prove or disprove the existence of any material fact." 'fhe 
evidence concerning the purchase and consumption of the alcohol 
by the deceased was irrelevar1t because it did not tend to prove 
the only affirmative defense raised by the defendants relatin~ to 
contributory negligence. 
Neglic;ence has been defined by this Court to mean "breach of 
a duty to use due care under the circumstances of the situation." 
~1eeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 9d5, 98~ (1967). ln 
order to be admissible, the evidence would have to tend to prove 
that by reason of the consurnptj_on of alcohol, the decedent, £van 
Pearce, was unable to exercise due care for his own safety. The 
defendants utterly failed to show any causal connection between 
the purchase or consumption of alcohol and any lack of due care 
for his own safety by the decedent. Hr. Hunt was not present 
during any of the eventd surrounding the water skiing excursion 
in question and none of the other witnesses testified as to any 
observable signs of drinkin0 or intoxication on the ~art of the 
decedent. 
Counsel for tae defendants was perfectly aware of his inability 
to relate the drinkint;, to any reco6 nizable standard or to actual 
observable physical impairment. This is indicated in the followinb 
statement in chambers to the Court: 
Now let me be totally candid and above board 
with the Court. I have talked with l~ewell 
Knight, I have talked with the State Toxicolo-
gist, in an effort to try and determine the 
amount of alcohol in this boy's system when 
the accident occurred, based on the testimony 
of Rod Hunt. The truth of the matter is they 
can't be very helpful unless the amount of 
alcohol is more correctly 4uantified. And 
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Rod Hunt cannot do it. I believe, though, 
Judge, that the jury has the right to know 
what happened the night before, and even 
though we don't have any scientific evidence 
that might suggest the amount of alcohol in 
the system, there is enough experience that 
jurors would have that they could draw their 
own conclusions. 
(R. at 258.) The court's response to Mr. Hansen's statement was, 
"You are over estimating jurors in this county." (R. at 258.) 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that evidence concerning 
the consumption of alcohol is irrelevant unless it can be related 
to a specific blood alcohol level, intoxication or some observ-
able effect of alcohol upon the person. The defendants were 
unprepared to present such causal relation, the court knew that 
they would be unable to do so during the preliminary motion to 
exclude the evidence and the defendants during the trial were 
never able to show any causal connection between the evidence and 
any negligence on the part of the plaintiff's decedent. The jury 
was simply left to draw such inferences as they might from the 
illegal purchase and the consumption of some unknown quantity of 
alcohol without any guidepost or reference point. The only 
effect of said evidence was to prejudice and inflame the jury. 
It is well known that the predominant religion in Utah 
County is the Latter-Day Saint Faith. That faith categorically 
proscribes the use of alcohol by its members and does it in such 
a way as to equate it with sin and misconduct. The ingrained 
abhorrence of such midconduct by members of that faith is such as 
to have easily prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff. To 
allow such testimony without any causal connection between the 
use of alcohol on the evening before the accident and the drowning 
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incident which claimed the life of Evan Pearce was to introduce 
an inflammatory, prejudicial and indefensible proposition to the 
jury. The plaintiff had no way of countering such highly preju-
dicial testimony, and any effort to rebut such testimony would 
simply serve to emphasize the point to the jury. 
Every case which discusses the issue of the relevancy of 
evidence of "intoxication" with respect to contributory negli-
gence, refers to the legal term "intoxication'' or to a specific 
blood alcohol content. Plaintiff readily concedes that had the 
defendants been able to show intoxication or some specific blood 
alcohol level or even some observable signs of impairment, the 
evidence would have been relevant and admissible. 
It is not difficult to understand why there was no evidence 
of observable impairment on the part of Evan Pearce in view of 
the well known scientific fact that individuals eliminate alcohol 
from the body at the rate of .015% of blood alcohol in the system 
every hour. This means that over a period of twelve hours, an 
individual with a .18% blood alcohol level would eliminate all 
alcohol from his body. 
In Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 
(6th Cir. 1974), a railroad fireman was killed by a moving train 
while working as an employee of the defendant. The executrix of 
the defendant's estate sought to recover for the death under the 
Federal Employer's Liability Act. During the trial the defen-
dants introduced evidence to the effect that plaintiff's decedent 
had been drinking some time previous to the accident. Plaintiff 
maintained that the drinking was too remote in time and was 
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therefore inadmissible. In ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence that the decedent had been drinking the court held: 
Clearly, testimony tending to show that the 
decedent had been drinking before a fatal acci-
dent is generally relevant to the jury's consider-
ation of contributory negligence • • • • Yet 
the relevance of such evidence disappears rr-
the drinking occurred so long before the accident 
that the alcohol could no longer have any effect 
on the decedent's conduct. The probative value of 
such evidence must be closely scrutinized to avoid 
the possibility of prejudice to the party charged 
with negligence. In this case particularly in 
view of the testimony of appellee's expert Martin 
that any alcohol consummed by the decedent in 
Cincinnati on Thursday night and early Friday, 
would not still be in his blood at the time of the 
accident on Saturday evening, references to the 
so-called Cincinnati drinking should not have been 
received or should have been stricken. The same 
is true with respect to the ambigious references 
to Wild Turkey Bourbon. This evidence was much 
too remote and uncertain to be of probative value 
on this issue of contributory negligence. 
502 F.2d at 1121 (Emphasis added). 
The time frame in the instant case, is identical to that 
described in the Bach case above and the denial of plaintiff's 
motion in limine cannot be dismissed as harmless error as the 
ruling in that case properly states as follows: 
As the evidence is convincing that the decedent, 
whether drunk or sober, was guilty of a high 
degree of negligence in sitting on a rail, know-
ing that the train was soon to return, his head 
down resting on his hands and knees oblivious of 
this impending doom despite the-train's continuous 
whistle and other sounds, can it be said that the 
court errs in charging the Ohio Statute and in 
admitting the challenged evidence of drinking were 
harmless? We think not. This is true primarily 
because under the F.E.L.A. the issue was not 
negligence alone but comparative negligence as 
between the decedent and the railroad. • • • The 
jury's responsiblity was to fix the degree of 
negligence of each party. We are unable to say 
that the erroneous rulings on the drinking issue 
were simply innocuous and played no part in causing 
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the jury to find the decednet 80% negligent 
rather than say, 50% or 60% or some other 
percentage less than 80% negligent. 
502 F2d at 1121-1122. 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, there is a 
further determination to be made as to its admissibility pursuant 
to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states as follows: 
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, 
the Judge may in his discretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the risk that 
its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time, or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the 
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) 
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who 
has not had reasonable opportunity to antici-
pate that such evidence would be offered. 
The recent case of Terry v. Zions Co.-Op. Mercantile Insti-
tution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), discusses in detail the applica-
tion of the above cited evidentiary rule in cases such as that 
presented to the Court. In the Terry case, the trial court 
limited the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's prior 
arrest and conviction for shop lifting. The defendant argued 
that since the plaintiff's claim was to the effect that the 
subject matter detention and arrest caused her severe emotional 
distress and damaged her reputation, it should be allowed to 
present evidence concerning the nature and substance of the prior 
conviction. The trial court refused to allow such evidence and 
in affirming the decision, this Court said: 
Although the relevancy of the proffered 
evidence is crucial, the probative value of 
the evidence, standing alone, does not determine 
its admissibility ••• This principle has 
been codified in Rule 45, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, ••• The trial judge effectuated 
this protection by restricting the evidence 
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admitted to the fact of the prior act and the 
identity of the party involved. In his 
decision to exclude the substantive effects 
of the incident, the trial judge took into 
consideration the delay and confusion that 
would result from a re-trial of the prior 
conviction, the remoteness of the prior act, 
and the tendency the proffered evidence would 
have to mislead and prejudice the jury. 
605 P.2d at 322 and 323 (emphasis added). 
Concededly, the determination as to undue prejudice is one 
to be made by the trial court in its discretion. The facts of 
the present case show that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion in allowing the admission of the evidence in question. 
In analyzing the exercise of discretion by the court, it is 
important to note that if the evidence concerning the consumption 
of alcohol were not sufficient error by itself, the court allowed 
the defendants to compound the error by presenting testimony over 
objection that the alcohol had been illegally purchased by the 
decedent. It is axiomatic that such evidence is irrelevant and 
could only relate to the decedent's bad character. The only 
purpose of such testimony is to influence and prejudice the jury. 
The mischief of allowing such testimony is to introduce a 
shadow defense for which the plaintiff cannot respond. Analogous 
to the circumstance is the Dead Man's Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-24-2(3)(1977), which would have prohibited this type of 
testimony wherein the only rebutting testimony was possessed by 
the decedent. While the Dead Man's Statute is not in point as a 
matter of subject, it is in point in regard to the spirit of the 
law regarding fair play. 
The result of the court's denial of plaintiff's motion in 
limine was to allow the defendants to demean and besmirch the 
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reputation of the decedent by implying that some significant orgy 
had occurred the night before the accident, and that the decedent 
was a participant. The very nature of the testimony placed the 
decedent among a class of people generally rejected in the philo-
sophic view of the majority of the people in Utah County. While 
one does not know the religious and philosophic convictions of 
the jury, in light of the religious demographics of the area from 
which the jury was drawn, it is not hard to envision that all or 
at least a significant portion of the jury subscribed to the 
beliefs of the predominant religious denomination. 
Based on the above-cited authority and analysis it is clear 
that the court's admission of evidence regarding consumption of 
alcohol by the decedent, Evan Pearce, was unduly prejudical and 
reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13 REGARDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT EVAN PEARCE 
WAS EXERCISING DUE CARE FOR HIS OWN SAFETY WAS ERROR. 
The instinct of self-preservation and the known disposition 
of man to avoid injury and harm to himself are common knowledge. 
Demille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159 (1969), Haman v. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 415 P.2d 305, 310 (Idaho 
1966); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651 
(1950); Staab v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 23 Idaho 314, 
129 P. 1078 (1913). Based on said instincts a presumption arises 
which the courts have presented to juries by way of instruction. 
In Demille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 
(1969), plaintiff maintained a wrongful death action against 
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defendant as a result of a head-on collision on a highway. In 
ruling on the issue of the presumption that an individual exer-
cises due care for his or her own safety, the Supreme Court of 
Utah held: 
There was a presumption, based upon the 
instinct of self-preservation, that the 
deceased, Spendlove, was exercising due care 
for his own safety; this presumption may take 
the place of evidence sufficient to make a 
positive finding in the absence of other 
evidence. 
The court in Demille concluded that the presumption was 
rebuttable upon the establishment of a prima f acia case by the 
opposing party and that it is a question for the court whether 
such prima facia case has been established. 462 P.2d at 161. 
In the instant case it is impossible to conclude, based on 
the record, that the defendants established a prima facia case 
sufficient to rebut the presumption. Testimony at trial indi-
cated that Evan Pearce made every effort to get back to the boat 
after the rope became entangled in the propeller mechanism. (R. 
349-352, 366-369.) Except while making a final effort to reach 
the boat he wore a life jacket at all times. He was neither 
passive nor indifferent in his attempts to secure his own safety, 
but rather, made all conceivable efforts in that regard. 
In Harnan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, ·415 P.2d 
305, 310-311 (Idaho 1966), a life insurance beneficiary brought 
an action against the insurer for the benefits of the policy. In 
holding that the lower court's jury instruction on presumption of 
the decedents due care for his safety was proper, the Supreme 
Court of Idaho stated: 
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As to the evidentiary and procedural effect 
of such presumption, this court has held the 
presumption of due care creates a prima facia 
case of due care upon the part of the person 
killed. • • if insufficient evidence is 
presented by the party against whom the 
presumption operates, the presumption will 
entitle the party relying on it to judgment. 
The court in Harnan outlined the analysis to be followed 
when evidence is presented contrary to the presumption: 
In Department of Finance v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 61 Idaho 484, 104 P.2d 1110 
(1940), it was held that if reasonable minds 
might differ as to the conclusions to be 
drawn from the evidence opposing the presumption 
the matter should be submitted to the jury, 
and the jury informed as to the presumption, 
quoting from Geist v. Moore, 58 Idaho 149, 70 
P.2d 403 (1937), as follows: 
• • • and in the following cases 
this court had definitely comitted 
itself to the doctrine that where 
there is a conflict between the 
presumption and contrary evidence, 
from which reasonable minds might 
draw different conclusions, it is 
proper to instruct the jury as to 
the presumption. 
415 P.2d at 311 (emphasis added). 
The record in the instant case shows little, if any, evidence 
indicating that Evan Pearce was not exercising due care for his 
own safety. In fact, the testimony on record indicates that he 
was at the time of the emergency, endeavoring to secure his 
safety and well being. If the evidence was such that reasonable 
minds might draw different conclusions, it was not only proper, 
but also required that the instruction be given, together with 
any necessary instructions concerning presumptions and rebuttal 
of presumptions. 
Based on the authority cited above, plaintiff was entitled 
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to a jury instruction that he was exercising due care for his own 
safety and the court's failure to so instruct was error. 
POINT IV 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE BOAT IN ISSUE ttAS 
ERROR. 
In Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 445 (Utah 1981), as dis-
cussed in Point I, the Utah Supreme Court held that where a party 
introduces evidence in support of its theory of a case, that 
party is entitled to have that theory submitted to the jury and 
that failure by the court to submit the theory constitutes pre-
judicial error. 
In the instant case, a portion of the plaintiff's theory of 
the case was that an anchor on the boat in question was statu-
torily required. The law is, in pertinent part: "All vessels 
except those capable of being safely beached shall be equipped 
with an anchor and line of sufficient weight and length to 
securely anchor such vessel." Utah Code Ann., §73-18-8 (1980); 4 
Utah Admin. R. §A60-01-3(3)(b)(l2) (1975). 
The evidence introduced by plaintiff was by expert witnesses 
at trial who indicated that during a wind storm on Utah Lake, a 
boat of the size and type in question would not be beachable and 
would, therefore, require an anchor on board to be in compliance 
with Utah law. (R. at 468.) The absence of an anchor on board 
was well documented by testimony at trial. (R. at 38, 373-374, 
407.) 
Whether the law required an anchor to be aboard the boat 
may, arguendo, be debatable depending on whether the boat is 
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"beachable." One expert, Mr. Larry Davis, said it was not, (R. 
at 468), and one expert, Mr. Tuttle, said it was. (R. at 627.) 
Both, however, said an anchor was essential. Furthermore, the 
State of Utah, through its recreation department, had established 
safety standards, the departure from which would be negligence. 
Those standards were introduced into evidence and categorically 
stated that for this boat an anchor was an essential piece of 
safety equipment. The failure to have one aboard was negligence, 
especially in this case. The lake had a mean deapth of 9 feet. 
(R. at 442.) An anchor with a rode (length) of 30 feet would 
have been totally effective in preventing the drift of the boat 
and would have saved the life of Evan Pearce. 
Plaintiff maintains, as part of his theory of the case, that 
under the conditions that prevailed on Utah Lake at the time of 
the emergency, the lack of an anchor on board the boat consti-
tuted negligence on the part of the defendants. Plaintiff sup-
ported his theory by evidence adduced at trial as required by the 
general rule in Watters. In view of the holding in Watters and 
the evidence introduced at trial, plaintiff is entitled to have 
his theory of the case submitted to the jury. The court's fail-
ure to give such an instruction to the jury would cause the jury 
to believe that the lack of an anchor was not a violation of law 
and that the defendants were not negligent in that respect. 
Apart from the statutory aspect discussed above, plaintiff 
submits that rules and regulations promulgated by the State of 
Utah, through the Division of Parks and Recreation, made it 
essential that an anchor be on board the boat in question and 
that pursuant to these rules and regulations the lack of an 
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anchor is evidence of negligence by the defendants. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction Number 8 contained a list 
of "essential" safety items as promulgated in a publication by 
the State of Utah through its Division of Parks and Recreation. 
(See Appendix A-1.) This list of "essential" safety equipment 
was allowed into evidence as Exhibit Number 7 without objection 
from defendants. Plaintiff maintains that this list constitutes 
a safety standard, the deviation from which constitutes negligence. 
In Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d, 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967), 
the plaintiff sued for injuries which he had received as a result 
of colliding with a glass sliding door owned and maintained by 
defendants. Plaintiffs were allowed to enter into evidence 
F.H.A. regulations on the necessity of having either safety glass 
or a horizontal metal bar in the door. The Utah Supreme Court 
allowed the evidence, holding that it was "one of the standards 
of the community in determining whether or not the defendants were 
negligent." (Emphasis added). The court in Wheeler continued by 
stating: 
While it is true that the ueight of authority 
is against allowing regulations such as those 
of F.H.A. to be given in evidence, yet there 
is a respectable authority permitting such 
evidence to be received. [Citations omitted]. 
431 P.2d at 987. 
In Sage v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 380 P.2d 856 
(Wash. 1963), the administratrix of decedent's estate maintained 
a wrongful death action against defendants as a result of a 
collision which claimed the decedent's life. The Supreme Court 
of Washington held that plaintiff was entitled to introduce as 
evidence certain safety standards which were contained in a 
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booklet promulgated by the National Safety Council. 
A trend exists in the law which allows codes or standards of 
safety issued or sponsored by governmental bodies to be admitted 
into evidence on the issue of negligence. As evidenced by the 
decision in Wheeler, Utah is among the minority that allows such 
codes and safety standards to be introduced into evidence. 
Annot., 78 ALR 2d 778 §3(b)(l96l)(cases cited in, Later Case 
Service 1975). 
In the instant case, plaintiff established by introduction 
of Exhibit 7, that safety regulations exist in the State of Utah 
which would make an anchor an essential piece of equipment on 
board the boat in question. Based on the authority in Wheeler 
and the safety standards promulgated by the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreation, the lack of an anchor on the boat in ques-
tion was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants. 
Plainiffs requested Instruction Number 8 6oncerned the 
specific safety regulations promulgated by the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreation. Since the safety equipment list was intro-
duced into evidence without objection, it was error for the court 
not to give plaintiff's Instruction Number 8 in order to allow 
the jury to properly evaluate the evidence. 
The court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on 
plaintiff's theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat 
constitutes prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff proceeded in this action against the named defen-
dants on the theory that, the defendants were vicariously liable 
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for the negligence of Kevin Wistesen, a minor son of one of the 
defendants. Plaintiff presented this theory at trial, along with 
evidence to support the theory. Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled 
to have an instruction given to the jury which would adequately 
inform the jury of plaintiff's theory of the case. The Court 
failed to give such an instruction on the imputed liability of 
the defendants and such failure constituted prejudicial error. 
The plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by the erroneous 
admission of evidence inferring alcohol consumption by the 
decedent, Evan Pearce. The alleged consumption, if any, was 
remote in time, totally irrelevant, without any probative value 
and offered for the sole purpose to inflame and prejudice the 
jury against the decedent, Evan Pearce. Plaintiff made a motion 
in limine with respect to such evidence, which motion the Court 
denied. Plaintiff also made timely objections when such evi-
dence was introduced at trial. Defendants totally failed to 
show that the deceased, Evan Pearce, at the time of the accident, 
was intoxicated or otherwise influenced or debilitated from the 
consumption of alcohol. Defendants also conceded that they would 
be unable to make such a showing based on the testimony they 
would offer at trial. To further compound the inadmissibility 
and prejudicial effect of the evidence, defendants were allowed 
to introduce evidence that the decedent, Evan Pearce, illegally 
purchased the alcoholic beverages. It goes without saying that 
such evidence is inadmissible. It was egregiously inflammatory 
and was introduced only to demean and impugn the reputation of 
the decedent in the eyes of the jurors. The Court's failure to 
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grant plaintiff's motion in limine was prejudical error and 
grounds for reversal. 
Utah case law establishes the presumption that a person 
exercises due care for his or her own safety. This presumption 
should be presented to the jury in the form of an instruction 
even if the other party presents evidence which runs contra to 
the presumption as long as reasonable minds might differ as to 
the conclusions to be drawn from such evidence. In the instant 
case, the evidence offers every indication that the decedent, 
Evan Pearce, made very conceivable effort and exercised all due 
care to secure his own safety. The Court did not give either 
plaintiff's requested instruction on the presumption or an equiva-
lent instruction. The Court's failure to so instruct the jury 
constituted error. 
Plaintiff presented evidence in support of the theory, that 
Utah law required an anchor to be aboard the boat in question. 
Plaintiff also presented evidence that the State of Utah, through 
its Division of Parks and Recreation, has promulgated and pub-
lished rules and regulations which make an anchor an essential 
item of safety equipment on a boat such as the one in question. 
Plaintiff submits that the lack of an anchor on board the defen-
dants' boat was a departure from these rules and regulations and 
as such, was evidence of negligence. Again, plaintiff maintains 
that he was entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury and 
the failure of the Court to instruct the jury in that theory 
constitutes prejudicial error. +L, 
Respectfully submitted this (2._ day of July, 1982. 
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, for: 
HOWARD, LENIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P. o. Box 778 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the State of Utah, through its 
Division of Parks & Recreation, .has approved a list of essential 
equipment for safe boating. That list is as follows: 
Equ_ipment for Safety Afloat 
- ·- "" . 
:.. 
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You may use the above developed list for the purpose of 
determining whether the boat, which is involved in this litiga-
tion, was· properly equipped for safe operation, and whether in 
your opinion, the failure to have any of said equipment on the 
boat was the proximate cause of the death of Evan Pearce. 
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